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Micro-level data have had a profound influence on research in international trade over the last ten
years. In many regards, this research agenda has been very successful. New stylized facts have been
uncovered and new trade models have been developed to explain these facts. In this paper we investigate
to which extent answers to new micro-level questions have affected answers to an old and central question
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1 Introduction
What share of ￿rms export? How large are exporters? How many products do they export?
Over the last ten years, micro-level data have allowed trade economists to shed light on these
and other micro-level questions. The objective of our paper is to look back at this research
agenda and investigate to what extent answers to new micro-level questions have a⁄ected
our answers to an old and central question in international trade: How large are the gains
from trade? A crude summary of our results is: ￿So far, not much.￿
Motivated by the recent trade literature, our analysis focuses on models featuring ￿ve
basic assumptions: Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, one factor of production, linear cost functions,
complete specialization, and iceberg trade costs. Examples of trade models satisfying these
restrictions include, among others, Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2003), and multiple variations and extensions of Melitz (2003).1 Within
that class of models, we identify two critical macro-level restrictions, a CES import demand
system and a gravity equation,2 and show that if these two restrictions hold, then under
either perfect competition or monopolistic competition, there exists a common estimator of
the gains from trade. This estimator only depends on the value of two aggregate statistics:
(i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ￿, which is equal to one minus the import
penetration ratio; and (ii) a gravity-based estimator " of the elasticity of imports with respect
to variable trade costs, which we refer to as the ￿trade elasticity.￿
According to our results, whether gains from trade derive from reallocations across sec-
tors, across ￿rms within sectors, or across products within ￿rms, the two previous aggregate
statistics remain su¢ cient for welfare analysis. Put di⁄erently, within that particular, but
important class of models, the mapping between trade data and welfare is independent of
the micro-level details of the model we use.
In order to establish this stark equivalence result, we proceed as follows. We start by
showing that the percentage change in the consumer price index associated with any small
change in trade costs is equal to ￿ b ￿
.
", where b ￿ is the percentage change in the share of
expenditure devoted to domestic goods caused by the change in trade costs and " is the true
value of the trade elasticity. For " < 0, which is the empirically relevant case, being more
1Notable extensions of Melitz (2003) satisfying the restrictions above include Chaney (2008), Arkolakis
(2008), and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008).
2A CES import demand system is conceptually distinct from Dixit-Stiglitz preferences; it entails restric-
tions on the interplay between domestic demand and supply. The import demand system is CES if the
elasticity of substitution of country j￿ s import demand from country i (relative to the demand for domestic
goods) with respect to the trade cost from i0 to j is zero for i0 6= i and is equal to a constant for i0 = i 6= j.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 2
open, b ￿ < 0, implies a welfare gain. We then use our assumption that " is constant across
equilibria to integrate small changes in real income between the initial trade equilibrium and
the autarky equilibrium. This allows us to establish that the total size of the gains from
trade, i.e. the percentage change in real income necessary to compensate a representative
consumer for going to autarky, is equal to ￿
1=" ￿ 1. Finally, assuming that the true trade
elasticity " can be consistently estimated by " using a gravity equation, we conclude that
the gains from trade can be consistently estimated by ￿
1=" ￿ 1.
This last formula o⁄ers a very convenient way to measure gains from trade in practice.
For example, the import penetration ratios for the U.S. and Belgium for the year 2000 were
7% and 27%, respectively.3 This implies that ￿US = 0:93 and ￿BEL = 0:73. Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2004) review studies that o⁄er gravity-based estimates for the trade elasticity
all within the range of ￿5 and ￿10. Thus, the total size of the gains from trade range from
0:7% to 1:5% for the U.S. and from 3:2% to 6:5% for Belgium, whatever the micro origins
of these gains may be.
The common features of the trade models for which we derive these formulas are described
in Section 2. As previously mentioned, these features consist of ￿ve basic assumptions and
two critical macro-level restrictions: (i) a CES import demand system; and (ii) a gravity
equation. In the rest of this paper, we simply refer to this class of models as ￿gravity￿
models.
Section 3 focuses on the case of gravity models with perfect competition, which will
allow us to describe the logic behind our welfare formula in a very intuitive manner. In a
neoclassical environment, a change in trade costs a⁄ects welfare through changes in terms-of-
trade. Since there is only one factor of production, changes in terms-of-trade only depend on
changes in relative wages and trade costs. Under complete specialization and a CES import
demand system, these changes can be directly inferred from changes in the relative demand
for domestic goods using an estimate of the trade elasticity, which the gravity equation
provides.
A direct corollary of our analysis under perfect competition is that two very well-known
gravity models, Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), have identical welfare im-
plications. In Anderson (1979), like in any other ￿Armington￿model, there are only con-
sumption gains from trade, whereas there are both consumption and production gains from
3Import penetration ratios are calculated from the OECD Input-Output Database: 2006 Edition as im-
ports over gross output (rather than GDP), so that they can be interpreted as a share of (gross) total
expenditures allocated to imports (see Norihiko and Ahmad (2006)).New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 3
trade in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Nevertheless, our results imply that the gains from trade
in these two models are the same: as we go from Anderson (1979) to Eaton and Kortum
(2002), the appearance of production gains must be exactly compensated by a decline in
consumption gains from trade.
Section 4 turns to the case of gravity models with monopolistic competition. In this
situation, the intuition behind our welfare formula is more subtle. In addition to their e⁄ects
on relative wages, changes in trade costs now have implications for ￿rms￿entry decisions as
well as their selection into exports. Both e⁄ects lead to changes in the set of goods available
in each country, which must also be taken into account in our welfare analysis. A CES import
demand system again greatly simpli￿es the analysis. On the one hand, it guarantees that the
number of entrants must remain constant under free entry. On the other hand, it guarantees
that any welfare change not caused by changes in the number of entrants￿ whether it a⁄ects
relative wages or the set of goods available in a given country￿ can still be inferred from
changes in the share of domestic expenditure using the trade elasticity o⁄ered by the gravity
equation. Our welfare formula directly follows from these two observations.
Section 5 investigates the robustness of our results. We ￿rst explore how our simple
welfare formula may extend to other gravity models. Following the recent literature on
trade and ￿rm heterogeneity, we consider models with restricted entry, as in Chaney (2008),
endogenous marketing costs, as in Arkolakis (2008), and models with multi-product ￿rms,
in the spirit of Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2007).
Although some of these extensions are crucial to explain micro-level facts, e.g., the impact
of trade liberalization on the distributions of ￿rm size and ￿rm productivity, we show that
they leave our simple welfare formula unchanged.
Finally, we consider generalizations of gravity models, including models with multiple
sectors, as in Costinot and Komunjer (2007) and Donaldson (2008), multiple factors, as in
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) and Chor (2009), and tradable intermediate goods, as
in Eaton and Kortum (2002), Alvarez and Lucas (2007), and Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2009). While our simple welfare formula no longer holds in these richer environments,
we demonstrate that generalized versions can easily be derived using the same logic as in
Sections 3 and 4. In particular, we show that conditional on a given market structure,
either perfect or monopolistic competition, there still exists aggregate su¢ cient statistics
for welfare analysis. Compared to our previous results, the main di⁄erence is that the
equivalence between generalized gravity models with perfect and monopolistic competition
may break down due to changes in the number of entrants.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 4
Our paper is related to the recent literature in public ￿nance trying to isolate robust
insights for welfare analysis across di⁄erent models; see e.g. Chetty (2009). As in that liter-
ature, using a ￿su¢ cient statistics approach￿allows us to make welfare predictions without
having to solve for all endogenous variables in our model. In a ￿eld such as international
trade where general equilibrium e⁄ects are numerous, this represents a signi￿cant bene￿t.
In the international trade literature, there is now a large number of empirical papers
focusing on the measurement of the gains from trade; see e.g. Feenstra (1994), Klenow and
Rodr￿guez-Clare (1997), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Feenstra and Kee (2008), Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2009), and Feenstra and Weinstein (2009). The purpose
of such exercises is to quantify the contribution of particular margins, e.g., new goods or new
products, to changes in the consumer price index. The goal of our paper is quite di⁄erent:
instead of establishing that a particular margin is small or large, we stress that in many new
trade models, whatever the contribution of particular margins may be, the total size of the
gains from trade can always be computed using the same aggregate statistics, ￿ and ".
From a theoretical standpoint, our paper builds on the seminal contribution of Eaton and
Kortum (2002) who ￿rst computed real wages as a function of ￿ and " in a Ricardian model
with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences and productivity levels drawn from a FrØchet distribution.
In recent work, Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008) also used closed
forms to compute the real wage as a function of ￿ and " in a Melitz-type model with Dixit-
Stiglitz preferences, monopolistic competition, free or restricted entry, and heterogenous
￿rms with a Pareto distribution of productivity. Noting that the expression was similar to
the one derived by Eaton and Kortum (2002)￿ and could have been derived by Krugman
(1980)￿ Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008) argued that the gains
from trade in these models were the same.4 The main di⁄erence between our paper and
theirs is in terms of method and scope. Our analysis goes beyond their original claim by
identifying two critical macro-level restrictions, a CES import demand system and gravity,
such that for a particular, but important class of models, ￿ and " are su¢ cient statistics for
the estimation of the gains from trade. This general approach allows us to o⁄er a unifying
perspective on the welfare implications of gravity models under di⁄erent market structures.
4In a recent paper, Feenstra (2009) uses duality theory to revisit, among other things, the results of
Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008). Under the same functional form assumptions, he
shows how the gains from trade in the Melitz-type model computed by Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow and
Rodr￿guez-Clare (2008) can be interpreted as ￿production gains￿from trade, whereas the gains from trade
in Krugman (1980) can be interpreted as ￿consumption gains.￿However, he does not discuss the fact that
conditional on trade data, the total size of the gains from trade predicted by these two models is the same.
This is our main focus.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 5
Another related paper is Atkeson and Burstein (2009), which focuses on the welfare gains
from trade liberalization through its e⁄ects on entry and exit of ￿rms and their incentives
to innovate in a monopolistically competitive environment with symmetric countries as in
Melitz (2003). At the theoretical level, they show that if small changes in trade costs are
symmetric, then their impact on welfare must be the same as in Krugman (1980). While their
analytical results and ours have the same ￿ avor, the logic is quite di⁄erent. Their results
consist in showing that in this environment, the overall contribution of ￿new￿ margins,
i.e. any margins not already present in Krugman (1980), must be o⁄set, to a ￿rst-order
approximation, by changes in entry. By contrast, this o⁄setting e⁄ect is (generically) absent
from the gravity models with monopolistic competition considered in our paper. Our results
simply state that whatever the welfare e⁄ects associated with these new margins are, the
total size of the gains from trade can still be inferred from aggregate trade ￿ ows alone.
2 Gravity Models
The objective of this section is to clarify the scope of our analysis by describing some of the
main features of the trade models considered in the next two sections.
The Basic Environment. Throughout this paper, we consider a world economy comprising
i = 1;:::;n countries; one factor of production, labor; and multiple goods indexed by ! 2 ￿.
The number of goods in ￿ may be continuous or discrete. Each country is populated by a










where qi (!) is the quantity consumed of good ! in country i and ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between goods !.5 We denote by Pi the consumer price index in country i. We
assume that workers are immobile across countries. Li and wi denote the total endowment
of labor and the wage in country i, respectively. Finally, we assume that technology is such
that all cost functions are linear in output.
Bilateral Imports. We denote by Xij the value of country j￿ s imports from country i, by
Yj ￿
Pn
i0=1 Xi0j the total expenditure in country j, and by ￿ij ￿ Xij/Yj the share of country
5Since the number of goods in ￿ may be continuous or discrete, one should think of Ui as a Lebesgue
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j0s total expenditure that is devoted to goods from country i. In any trade equilibrium, we
assume complete specialization in the sense that almost all goods are bought from only one
source, though this source may vary across countries. Formally, if we denote by ￿ij ￿ ￿
the set of goods that country j buys from country i, complete specialization requires the
measure of goods in ￿ij \ ￿i0j to be equal to zero for all i, i0 6= i, and j.6 Accordingly,




pj (!)qj (!)d!, (1)
where pj(!) denotes the price of good ! in country j.
Bilateral Trade Costs. Trade ￿ ows are subject to variable trade costs of the standard
iceberg form: in order to sell one unit in country j, ￿rms from country i must ship ￿ij ￿ 1
units. We assume that the matrix of variable trade costs ￿ ￿ f￿ijg is such that ￿ii = 1 for
all i and ￿il￿lj ￿ ￿ij for all i;l;j. Depending on the market structure, trade ￿ ows may also
be subject to ￿xed costs (Section 4).
The Import Demand System. Let X ￿fXijg denote the n ￿ n matrix of bilateral
imports and E denote the vector of country-speci￿c equilibrium variables in the economy.
Under perfect competition (Section 3), E is equal to the vector of wages in each country,
whereas under monopolistic competition E includes the vector of wages and number of
entrants in each country (Section 4). We refer to the mapping from variable trade costs, ￿,
and equilibrium variables, E, to bilateral imports, X, as the import demand system. With a
slight abuse of notation, we write Xij ￿ Xij (￿;E). This mapping, of course, depends on the
other primitives of the model: preferences, technology, and market structure. This simple
formulation allows us to distinguish between the direct impact of variable trade costs and
their indirect impact through general equilibrium e⁄ects.
Throughout this paper, we will restrict ourselves to a class of models where the import
demand system satis￿es two macro-level restrictions.
Macro-level Restriction (I): CES import demand system. Let "ii0
j ￿ @ ln(Xij=Xjj)/@ ln￿i0j





i;i06=j denote the associated (n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ 1) matrix. In any trade equilibrium, the
6This de￿nition of complete specialization allows multiple countries to produce the same good. It only
rules out equilibria such that multiple countries sell the same good in the same country.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 7
import demand system is such that
"j =
0
B B B B
@
" 0 ::: 0
0 ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: 0
0 ::: 0 "
1
C C C C
A
(2)
with " < 0, which is the empirically relevant case. We refer to an import demand system
such that Equation (2) is satis￿ed for all j as a ￿CES import demand system￿and to " as
the ￿trade elasticity￿of that system.7
It should be clear that this macro-level restriction imposes a lot of symmetry among
countries. First, since all the diagonal terms are equal in Equation (2), any given change in
bilateral trade costs, ￿ij, must have the same impact on relative demand, Xij=Xjj, for all
i 6= j. Second, since all the o⁄-diagonal terms are equal to zero, any change in a third country
trade costs, ￿i0j, must have the same proportional impact on Xij and Xjj. Put di⁄erently,
changes in relative demand are ￿separable￿across exporters: the relative demand for goods
from country i, Xij=Xjj, only depends on ￿ij.
Two additional comments are in order. First, the trade elasticity is a partial derivative:
it captures the direct e⁄ect of changes in variable trade costs on pj(!) and ￿ij, but not their
indirect e⁄ect through changes in wages or the total number of entrants. Second, the trade
elasticity is an upper-level elasticity: it tells us how changes in variable trade costs a⁄ect
aggregate trade ￿ ows, whatever the particular margins of adjustment, pj(!) or ￿ij, may be.
Macro-level restriction (II): Gravity. In any trade equilibrium, the import demand
system satis￿es ￿gravity￿in the sense that bilateral imports can be decomposed into
lnXij (￿;E) = Ai (￿;E) + Bj (￿;E) + "ln￿ij + ￿ij, (3)
where Ai (￿), Bj (￿), " and ￿ij all depend on preferences, technology, and market structure.
Note that according to Equation (3), ￿ij is not a function of ￿ and E. This is an important
restriction, which makes Equation (3) an assumption, rather than a mere de￿nition of ￿ij.
7Our choice of terminology derives from the fact that in the case of a CES demand system, changes
in relative demand, Ck=Cl, for two goods k and l are such that @ ln(Ck=Cl)/@ lnpk0 = 0 if k0 6= k;l and
@ ln(Ck=Cl)/@ lnpk = @ ln(Ck0=Cl)/@ lnpk0 6= 0 for all k;k0 6= l. Nevertheless, it should be clear that the
assumption of a CES import demand system is conceptually distinct from the assumption of CES preferences.
While the import demand obviously depends on preferences, it also takes into account the supply side as
this a⁄ects the allocation of expenditures to domestic production.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 8
Under standard orthogonality conditions, the previous gravity equation o⁄ers a simple
way to obtain a consistent estimate, ", of the trade elasticity using data on bilateral imports,
Xij, and bilateral trade costs, ￿ij. For example, if the underlying distribution of ￿ij and
￿ij across countries satis￿es E (￿ij ln￿i0j0) = 0, for any i, i0, j, and j0 = 1;:::;N, then "
can be computed as a simple di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator. In the rest of this paper,
we will remain agnostic about the exact form of the orthogonality condition associated with
Equation (3), but assume that the same orthogonality condition can be invoked in all models.
Without any risk of confusion, we can therefore refer to " as the ￿gravity-based￿estimate of
the trade elasticity, whatever the particular details of the model may be.8
It is worth emphasizing that the two previous restrictions, CES and gravity, are di⁄erent
in nature and will play distinct roles in our analysis. CES imposes restrictions on how changes
in variable trade costs a⁄ect relative import demands across trade equilibria. By contrast,
gravity imposes restrictions on the cross-sectional variation of bilateral imports within a
given trade equilibrium. The former property will allow us to express gains from trade as a
function of the share of expenditure on domestic goods and the true trade elasticity, whereas
the latter will be important to obtain an estimate of the trade elasticity from observable
trade data. Finally, note that both properties are easy to check since they do not require to
solve for the endogenous equilibrium variables included in E.
Asymptotic Behavior. For technical reasons, we also assume that for any pair of countries
i 6= j, lim￿ij!+1 (wi￿ij=wj) = +1. This mild regularity condition guarantees that trade
equilibria converge to the autarky equilibrium as variable trade costs ￿ go to in￿nity.
To summarize, the main features of the trade models analyzed in our paper include
￿ve basic assumptions: (i) Dixit-Stiglitz preferences; (ii) one factor of production; (iii)
linear costs functions; (iv) complete specialization; and (v) iceberg trade costs; and two
macro-level restrictions: (i) a CES import demand system; and (ii) gravity. Although
these assumptions are admittedly restrictive, it is easy to check that they are satis￿ed in
many existing trade models including Anderson (1979), Krugman (1980), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), and
multiple variations and extensions of Melitz (2003), such as Chaney (2008), Arkolakis (2008),
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008), and Arkolakis and Muendler (2007).9
8Of course, the exact value of " as a function of trade data depends on the choice of the orthogonality
condition. The crucial assumption for our purposes, however, is that conditional on the choice of the
orthogonality condition, the exact value of " is the same in all models.
9This being said, we wish to be very clear that our analysis does not apply to all variations and extensionsNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 9
From now on, we refer to trade models satisfying the assumptions described in this section
as ￿gravity￿models. The rest of our paper explores the welfare implications of this class
of models under two distinct market structures: perfect and monopolistic competition. The
theoretical question that we are interested in is the following. Consider a hypothetical change
in variable trade costs from ￿ to ￿ 0, while keeping labor productivity and labor endowments
￿xed around the world.10 What is the percentage change in real income needed to bring a
representative worker from some country j back to her original utility level?
3 Gains from Trade (I): Perfect Competition
We start by assuming perfect competition. Given our assumptions on technology and the
number of factors of production, gravity models simplify into Ricardian models under perfect
competition. In this case, the vector of country speci￿c equilibrium variables is equal to the
vector of wages, E =(w1;:::;wn). To simplify notations, we suppress the arguments (￿;E)
from our trade variables in the rest of this section.
3.1 Equilibrium conditions




, for all ! 2 ￿ij, (4)
where zi (!) > 0 is the labor productivity for the production of good ! in country i. In ad-
dition, perfect competition requires each good to be produced in the country that minimizes












of Melitz (2003). Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), for example, falls outside the scope of our paper.
In their model bilateral trade ￿ ows go to zero for su¢ ciently large bilateral trade costs. This corresponds to
a situation in which ￿ij in Equation (3) is a function of trade costs, thereby violating our gravity property.
For similar reasons, the trade elasticity is not constant in this model, contradicting our CES property.
10This is a non-trivial restriction. When measuring the gains from trade, we will implictly abstract from
any direct channel through which changes in trade costs may a⁄ect labor productivity and labor endowments.
See Grossman and Helpman (1991) for an overview of trade models allowing for such e⁄ects.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 10
Finally, trade balance implies11
Yj = wjLj, (6)
Equipped with these three equilibrium conditions, we now investigate how changes in variable
trade costs a⁄ects welfare in each country.
3.2 Welfare analysis
Without loss of generality, we focus on a representative worker from country j and use labor
in country j as our numeraire, wj = 1. We start by considering a small change in trade costs
from ￿ to ￿ + d￿. Since the set of goods ￿ is ￿xed under perfect competition, changes in




￿j (!) b pj(!)d!, (7)
where b x ￿ dx=x denotes the relative change in a given variable x; and ￿j (!) is the share of
expenditure on good ! in country j.12 Using Equations (4) and (5) and the fact that there
is complete specialization, we can rearrange Equation (7) as
b Pj =
Pn
i=1 ￿ij (b wi + b ￿ij). (8)
Equation (8) reminds us that in a neoclassical environment, all changes in welfare must be
coming from changes in terms of trade. Since labor in country j is our numeraire, b wj = 0,
these changes are exactly equal to b wi + b ￿ij. By the Envelope Theorem, changes in trade
shares can only have a second order e⁄ect.
While the previous result is well-known, stronger welfare predictions can be derived in
the case of a CES import demand system. The core of our analysis relies on the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 In any gravity model with perfect competition, percentage changes in the con-
11Trade balance only plays a minor role in our analysis. All our results would hold under the weaker
assumption that there are trade de￿cits, but that their relative magnitude is una⁄ected by changes in trade
costs.
12Throughout this section, the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is stronger than needed. We merely
use the fact that all agents have identical homothetic preferences, which allows us to de￿ne the consumer price
index in country j. Dixit-Stiglitz preferences will, of course, play a crucial role when we study monopolistic
competition in Section 4.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 11
sumer price index satisfy
b Pj = ￿ b ￿jj
.
". (9)
The formal proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in the Appendix. The logic
can be sketched as follows. Under perfect competition, for any exporter i0, a one percent
increase in wi0 has the same e⁄ect on country j and other exporters as a one percent increase
in ￿i0j. By de￿nition of "ii0
j , changes in bilateral imports must therefore satisfy




j (b wi0 + b ￿i0j). (10)
A direct implication of Equation (10) is that if all elasticities "ii0
j are known, changes in terms
of trade can be inferred from changes in relative imports. To do so, we simply need to invert
a system of (n ￿ 1) ￿ (n ￿ 1) equations. Assuming that "j is invertible, which will always
be true in the case of a CES import demand system, Equations (8) and (10) imply



















Equation (11) provides a general characterization of welfare changes as a function of initial
trade shares, changes in trade ￿ ows, and upper level elasticities, whatever the particular
characteristics of the import demand system may be. Lemma 1 then simply derives from
the fact that in a gravity model, the import demand system is CES. The separability of























Equation (9) follows from these two observations.
It is worth emphasizing that Lemma 1 is a local result that does not depend on the
assumption that " is the same across all trade equilibria or countries. If we were to relax the
speci￿cation of the import demand system so that we had "ii
j = "j(￿;E) and "ii0
j = 0 for all
j and i 6= i0, then Lemma 1 would still hold. By contrast, our global results will heavily rely
on the fact that " is invariant to changes in trade costs.
We now consider the welfare impact of large changes in trade costs from ￿ to ￿ 0. Let
P 0
j denote the consumer price index in country j if trade costs are equal to ￿ 0; and let







denote the (negative of) the percentage change in real income neededNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 12
to bring a representative worker from country j back to her original utility level. Our ￿rst
global result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 In any gravity model with perfect competition, Wj can be consistently es-





￿1=￿ ", where ￿
0
jj and ￿jj are evaluated at the new and initial trade
equilibrium, respectively.
Proposition 1 derives from two observations. On the one hand, the fact that " is constant






On the other hand, the fact that " is a consistent estimator of " implies, by a standard











The implication of this proposition is that the welfare e⁄ect of a change in trade costs in
a gravity model with perfect competition can be measured using only: (i) the initial and the
new share of expenditure on domestic goods, ￿jj and ￿
0
jj; and (ii) the gravity-based estimate
of the trade elasticity, ". This o⁄ers a parsimonious way to compute welfare changes resulting
from changes in trade costs. In particular, one does not need to observe the way in which
all prices change, as would be suggested by Equation (7); it is su¢ cient to have information
about the trade elasticity, ", and the changes in trade ￿ ows as summarized by ￿jj and ￿
0
jj.
Note also that since " is negative in practice, see e.g. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004),
welfare increases, Wj > 0, whenever country j becomes more open, ￿
0
jj < ￿jj.
We de￿ne the gains from trade in country j, denoted by W j, as the percentage change in
current income needed to bring country j￿ s representative agent back to its original utility
level after going to autarky, i.e. after increasing all ￿ij, i 6= j, to in￿nity.13 Proposition 1
and the fact that ￿
0
jj = 1 under autarky immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 2 In any gravity model with perfect competition, W j can be consistently esti-
mated by (￿jj)
1=￿ " ￿ 1, where ￿jj is evaluated at the initial equilibrium.
This result implies that conditional on observed trade data, i.e. the values of ￿jj and
" in current trade equilibrium, the gains from trade predicted by all gravity models under
perfect competition must be the same. Within that class of models, new sources of gains
from trade may a⁄ect the composition of the gains from trade, but not their total size.14
13Formally, Wj is equal to ￿Wj evaluated at the counterfactual equilibrium with ￿ = +1:
14Throughout this paper, we have chosen to interpret ￿ as iceberg trade costs rather than tari⁄s. It should
be clear that our analysis of how changes in ￿ a⁄ect the price index does not depend on this particular
interpretation. The only di⁄erence between the two interpretations is that changes in tari⁄s would alsoNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 13
3.3 Anderson (1979) vs. Eaton and Kortum (2002)
To get a better understanding of the equivalence result emphasized in Proposition 2, we now
compare two well-known trade models, Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
On the demand side, both models assume Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The main di⁄erence
between the two models comes from the supply side. In Anderson (1979), countries cannot
produce the goods produced by other countries: if ai (!) < +1, then ai0 (!) = +1 for all
i0 6= i.15 By contrast, Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume that in each country, unit labor
requirements are drawn from an extreme value distribution. From a qualitative standpoint,
this is an important di⁄erence. It implies that there are both production and consumption
gains from trade in Eaton and Kortum (2002), whereas there can only be consumption gains
from trade in Anderson (1979).
Does that mean that the two models lead to di⁄erent quantitative predictions about the
size of the gains from trade? The answer is no. It is easy to check that both models ￿t
the ￿ve basic assumptions of gravity models given in Section 2. Furthermore, the import







where Ti and Tj are country-speci￿c technology parameters, " ￿￿1￿￿￿in Anderson (1979)
and " ￿￿￿￿￿in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Because of alternative microtheoretical founda-
tions, the (negative of the) trade elasticity is equal to the elasticity of substitution between
goods (minus one) in Anderson (1979) and it is equal to the shape parameter of the produc-
tivity distribution in Eaton and Kortum (2002). In both models, however, Equation (12)
implies that the import demand system satis￿es our two macro-level restrictions: CES and
gravity. We can therefore invoke Proposition 2 to conclude that conditional on two su¢ cient
statistics, ￿jj and ", the gains from trade predicted by Anderson (1979) and Eaton and
Kortum (2002) must be the same.16
This equivalence illustrates one of the main points of our paper in a very clear manner.
a⁄ect total income through changes in tari⁄ revenues. Since tari⁄ revenues are equal to zero under autarky,
our estimator of the gains from trade would simply become Wj = (￿jj)
1=" (1 + Tj)￿1, where Tj is the share
of tari⁄ revenues in country j￿ s income in the initial equilibrium. Thus conditional on ￿jj, ", and Tj, the
gains from trade predicted by all gravity models with perfect competition would remain the same.
15Under this assumption, endowment or ￿Armington￿ models such as Anderson (1979) can always be
reinterpreted as particular Ricardian models; see Matsuyama (2007).
16Using Equation (12), one can actually show a stronger result. Conditional on trade data, X and ", the
predicted changes in welfare associated with any counterfactual changes in trade costs, not just movements
to autarky, are the same in Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002). See Appendix for details.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 14
Since Eaton and Kortum (2002) allows countries to specialize according to comparative
advantage whereas Anderson (1979) does not, one may think that the gains from trade
predicted by Eaton and Kortum (2002) must be larger. Our analysis demonstrates that
this is not the case. As we switch from Anderson (1979) to Eaton and Kortum (2002),
the structural interpretation of the trade elasticity changes, re￿ ecting the fact there is now
one more margin, namely ￿ij, for bilateral imports to adjust. However, conditional on the
estimated value of the upper-level elasticity, ", more margins of adjustment can only a⁄ect
the composition of the gains from trade.
4 Gains From Trade (II): Monopolistic Competition
We now turn to the case of monopolistic competition. In this environment, gains from trade
may also derive from changes in the number of available varieties in each country, as in
Krugman (1980), as well as from changes in aggregate productivity due to intra-industry
reallocation, as in Melitz (2003).
In line with the previous literature, we now refer to goods as ￿varieties.￿We assume that
there is an unbounded pool of potential entrants capable of producing di⁄erentiated varieties.
In order to produce in country i, ￿rms must incur a ￿xed entry cost, fe > 0, in terms of
domestic labor. Mi denotes the total measure of entrants in country i. Upon entry, these
￿rms draw their productivity, z (!), from a known distribution with density gi. In order to
sell their varieties to country j, ￿rms from country i must then incur a ￿xed marketing cost,
fij ￿ 0, in terms of domestic labor. After marketing costs have been paid, trade ￿ ows are
subject to iceberg trade costs ￿ij ￿ 1 as in the neoclassical case.
Throughout this section, we refer to gravity models satisfying the previous assump-
tions as ￿gravity models with monopolistic competition.￿In this case, the vector of coun-
try speci￿c equilibrium variables is equal to the vector of wages and measures of entrants,
E =(w1;:::;wn;M1;:::;Mn). To simplify notation, we again suppress the arguments (￿;E)
from our trade variables in the rest of our analysis.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 15
4.1 Equilibrium conditions
Because of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, monopolists charge a constant markup over marginal
cost. In any country j, the price of a variety ! from country i is given by
pj(!) =
￿￿ijwi
(￿ ￿ 1)z (!)
for all ! 2 ￿ij. (13)
The associated pro￿ts, ￿ij (!), of a ￿rm with productivity z (!) operating in country i and

















is the consumer price index in country j. The set of
varieties from country i available in country j, ￿ij, is determined by the following zero-pro￿t
condition
￿ij = f! 2 ￿j￿ij (!) ￿ 0g. (15)













such that ￿rms from country i sell variety ! in country j if and only if z (!) ￿ z￿
ij . Finally,
free entry implies that total expected pro￿ts are equal to ￿xed entry costs,
Pn
i=1 E [￿ji (!)] = wjfe, (17)
and trade balance implies that total income is equal to the total wage bill
Yj = wjLj. (18)
4.2 Welfare analysis
Without loss of generality, we again focus on a representative worker from country j and
use labor in country j as our numeraire, wj = 1. Like in Section 3, we ￿rst consider small
changes in trade costs from ￿ to ￿ + d￿. Using Equations (13) and the de￿nitions of Pj,New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 16
Mi, and z￿






























Compared to welfare changes in the neoclassical case, Equation (8), there are two extra
terms, c Mi=(￿ ￿ 1) and ￿ijc z￿
ij=(￿ ￿ 1). Under monopolistic competition, these two terms
re￿ ect the fact that changes in trade costs may a⁄ect the set of varieties available in each
country, thereby creating new potential sources of gains from trade.
First, trade costs may a⁄ect ￿rms￿entry decisions. If a change in trade costs raises
the number of entrants in country i, c Mi > 0, the total number of varieties in country j
will increase and its consumer price index will decrease by ￿ijc Mi=(￿ ￿ 1) > 0. Second,
trade costs may a⁄ect ￿rms￿selection into exports. If a small change in trade costs lowers
the cut-o⁄ productivity level, c z￿
ij < 0, the total number of varieties in country j will also
increase. But, unlike changes in Mi, changes in z￿
ij will a⁄ect the composition of varieties
from country i in country j, as new exporters are less productive than existing ones. This
argument explains why the consumer price index will decrease by ￿￿ij￿ijc z￿
ij=(￿ ￿ 1) > 0
with the coe¢ cient ￿ij adjusting for changes in the number and composition of varieties
available in country j.
Again, the question that we want to ask is: Does the introduction of new sources of gains
from trade lead to larger gains from trade? Using Lemma 2, we will demonstrate that in the
case of a gravity model with monopolistic competition, the answer is still no.
Lemma 2 In any gravity model with monopolistic competition, percentage changes in the
consumer price index satisfy
b Pj = ￿ b ￿jj
.
". (21)
Equation (21) shows that conditional on ^ ￿jj and ", the welfare impact of changes in trade
costs is the same as under perfect competition. The proof of Lemma 2 can be sketched as
follows. Using Equation (16) and the fact that b Yj = b wj = 0 by our choice of numeraire, we
can express changes in the productivity cut-o⁄, c z￿
ij, as
c z￿





b wi ￿ b Pj: (22)New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 17





￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ij
￿
(b wi + b ￿ij)
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿j
￿
c Mi
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿j
￿
￿ij b wi ￿







i=1 ￿ij￿ij. Equation (23) illustrates two potential di⁄erences between perfect
and monopolistic competition. The ￿rst one, which we have already mentioned, is that
the set of varieties available in country j is not ￿xed. As a result, changes in terms of
trade, b wi + b ￿ij, may not be su¢ cient to compute welfare changes; in principle, one may
also need to keep track of changes in the number and composition of varieties, as captured
by ￿ c Mi
.￿
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿j
￿
+ ￿ij b wi
￿￿
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿j
￿
(1 ￿ ￿). The second di⁄erence, which is more
subtle, is related to the impact of terms of trade changes, b wi + b ￿ij. Even in the absence of
changes in the set of available varieties, Equation (23) shows that changes at the extensive
margin, i.e. changes in ￿ij, may directly a⁄ect the mapping between b Pj and b wi+b ￿ij. Because
changes in terms of trade may lead to the creation and destruction of varieties with di⁄erent
prices in di⁄erent countries, their impact may vary across countries, hence the correction term
￿
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ij
￿￿￿
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿j
￿
. In contrast, under perfect competition new varieties never have
a di⁄erent impact since the price of a good no longer produced by one country is equal to
its price in the new producing country.
The rest of our proof relies on the properties of a CES import demand system. We start
by showing that under a CES import demand system, the second of these two di⁄erences
necessarily is absent. Symmetry across countries implies ￿ij = ￿j = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ " for all i
and j, which means that the impact of changes in terms of trade must be the same for
all exporters in any importing country. As a result, we can use the same strategy as under
perfect competition to infer changes in terms of trade from changes in relative imports. After
simple rearrangements, Equation (23) can be expressed as
b Pj = ￿
b ￿jj ￿ c Mj
"
. (24)
According to Equation (24), welfare changes in country j only depends on changes in two
domestic variables: the share of expenditure on domestic goods, b ￿jj; and the number of
entrants, c Mj.17 To conclude the proof of Lemma 2, we show that, although the number of
17In the absence of a CES import demand system, one can show that changes in the price index still take
a very simple form, namely b Pj = ￿
￿
^ ￿jj ￿ ^ Mj
￿.￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿jj
￿
. In general, however, there is no simple
mapping between trade elastisticities, "j, and the relevant elasticity for welfare computations, 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿jj.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 18
varieties consumed in country j may vary, we necessarily have c Mj = 0. The formal argument
uses the fact that under a CES import demand system, aggregate revenues are proportional
to aggregate pro￿ts. As a result, the free entry condition completely pins down the number
of entrants, independently of the value of variable trade costs.
Lemma 2 can again be used to analyze the impact of a change in variable trade costs.
The exact same logic as in Section 3 leads to the two following propositions.
Proposition 3 In any gravity model with monopolistic competition, Wj can be consistently







jj and ￿jj are evaluated at the new and initial trade
equilibrium, respectively.
Proposition 4 In any gravity model with monopolistic competition, W j can be consistently
estimated by (￿jj)
1=" ￿ 1, where ￿jj is evaluated at the initial equilibrium.
A direct implication of Propositions 2 and 4 is that conditional on two su¢ cient trade
statistics, ￿jj and ", the gains from trade predicted by gravity models with perfect and
monopolistic competition are the same. Within the class of gravity models, as we switch
from perfect to monopolistic competition, the composition of the gains from trade changes,
but their total size does not.
Notwithstanding the importance of gravity models with monopolistic competition in the
existing literature, it is obvious that the strong equivalence between these models and gravity
models with perfect competition heavily relies on the fact that c Mj = 0. With this in mind, we
focus in the next subsection on the equivalence between two gravity models with monopolistic
competition, Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003). As we will see in Section 5, the equivalence
between these two models can also be generalized to situations in which c Mj 6= 0.
4.3 Krugman (1980) vs. Melitz (2003)
In line with our analysis under perfect competition, we conclude this section by comparing
two well-known gravity models with monopolistic competition. The ￿rst one corresponds
to the case in which gi is a degenerate density function with all the mass at some single
productivity level zi that may di⁄er across countries, and fij = 0 for all i;j. Under these
assumptions, there is no ￿rm heterogeneity and the model described in this section reduces
to Krugman (1980). The second model corresponds to the case in which gi is the density
function associated with a Pareto distribution, gi (z) ￿ ￿b￿z￿￿￿1 for z ￿ b, as in mostNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 19
extensions and variations of Melitz (2003).18 For expositional purposes, we will simply refer
to this model as Melitz (2003), though it should be clear that we implicitly mean ￿Melitz
(2003) with Pareto.￿ 19
In Krugman (1980), the absence of ￿xed exporting costs entails z￿
ij = 0 and ￿ij = 0 for
all i;j. Since entry also is invariant to trade barriers, c Mi = 0, this model therefore only
features consumption gains from trade, just like the Armington model presented in Section
3. By contrast, in Melitz (2003), although entry remains invariant to trade barriers, c Mi = 0,
changes in trade costs a⁄ect the productivity cuto⁄s z￿
ij. These changes at the extensive
margin may lead to changes in the number and composition of consumed varieties as well as
changes in aggregate productivity.
Since trade leads to the exit of the least e¢ cient ￿rms in this richer model, it may
be tempting to conclude that the gains from trade are larger. Our theoretical analysis
contradicts this intuition. In both Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003), it is easy to check











where Ti and Tj are country-speci￿c technology parameters; " ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ in Krugman (1980)
and " ￿ ￿￿ in Melitz (2003). Like in Section 3, the introduction of a new margin of
adjustment changes the structural interpretation of the trade elasticity, from a preference
to a technological parameter. Yet, because Equation (25) implies that the import demand
system satis￿es our two macro-level restrictions, CES and gravity, we can invoke Proposition
4 to conclude that conditional on " and ￿jj, the gains from trade are the same in the two
models.20
18A non-exhaustive list of examples includes Antras and Helpman (2004), Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007), Chaney (2008), Arkolakis (2008),
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008), and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008).
19Perhaps not surprisingly, one can show that in a gravity model with monopolistic competition, if gi is
di⁄erentiable for all z (which rules out Krugman (1980)), then gi must be the density of a Pareto distribution
with a common ￿ across all countries. Compared to the alternative strategy of assuming a Pareto distribution
right away, our general approach presents two important advantages. First, as we already mentioned in
Section 3, our local results still hold under the weaker assumption that trade elasticity may vary across trade
equilibria and countries, i.e., "ii
j can vary with j; ￿ and E. Second, and more importantly, our strategy
allows us to o⁄er a unifying perspective on the welfare implications of gravity models under di⁄erent market
structures by identifying the crucial macro-level restrictions from which they derive.
20Unlike in the case of perfect competition, Equation (25) does not necessarily imply that Krugman (1980)
and Melitz (2003) have the same welfare predictions for any counterfactual change in trade costs. Conditional
on trade data, X and ", Melitz (2003) may predict di⁄erent changes in trade ￿ ows than Krugman (1980) dueNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 20
As a careful reader may have already noticed, our assumption that there exists a common
orthogonality condition such that " can be estimated using a gravity equation is somewhat
stronger under monopolistic than perfect competition. In the case of Anderson (1979) and
Eaton and Kortum (2002), we had ￿ij ￿ 0 so that, for example, E (￿ij ln￿i0j0) = 0 was
trivially satis￿ed in both models. While the same is true in Krugman (1980), this is not
the case in Melitz (2003) where ￿ij ￿ (fij)
1+ "
￿￿1. For a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator
to be a consistent estimator, we would therefore need additional assumptions about the
joint distribution of ￿xed and variable trade costs. In our view, this issue is similar to the
problem one would face under perfect competition if part of the variable trade costs were not
observable. Again one would need observable and unobservable component of trade costs to
be uncorrelated, or an instrumental variable, in order to avoid omitted variable bias. The
fact that this unobserved component is ￿xed rather than variable does not change what we
view primarily as an econometric issue, which we have little to contribute to.21
5 Extensions
The objective of this section is twofold. First, we wish to establish the robustness of our
simple welfare formula by o⁄ering additional examples of gravity models, not considered in
Sections 3 and 4, in which the gains from trade can be consistently estimated by ￿
1="￿1. Our
choice of examples is motivated by recent developments in the literature on ￿rm heterogeneity
and trade. In line with this literature, we focus on variations and extensions of Melitz (2003)
including: (i) restricted entry; (ii) endogenous marketing costs; and (iii) multi-product
￿rms.22 Although some of these extensions are crucial to explain micro-level facts, we show
that they leave our simple formula unchanged. In a gravity model with restricted entry,
endogenous marketing costs, or multi-product ￿rms, the share of domestic expenditure and
to the di⁄erent elasticity of trade ￿ ows with respect to wages in the two models, namely " in Krugman (1980)
versus 1+￿"=(￿￿1) in Melitz (2003). A notable exception is the case where all countries are symmetric. In
this situation, there are no changes in wages, and so, the two models lead to the the same welfare predictions
for any (symmetric) change in trade costs.
21As we pointed out in footnote 10, this issue is di⁄erent from the economic issue raised by Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008): according to their model, ￿ij is a function of ￿ij.
22Another type of gravity model entails heterogeneous quality, as in Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) and
Johnson (2009). While the introduction of quality considerations are crucial to explain the variation in the
distribution of prices across ￿rms and countries, it is isomorphic to a change in the units of account, which
must again leave our welfare predictions unchanged. Quality considerations may, of course, have important
distributional consequences in environments with multiple factors of production; see e.g. Verhoogen (2008)
and Kugler and Verhoogen (2008). They may also matter in the presence of minimum quality requirements,
which we are also abstracting from; see e.g. Hallak and Sivadasan (2009).New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 21
the trade elasticity remain su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis.
Second, we wish to illustrate how our simple welfare formula may still hold in simple
generalizations of gravity models. Motivated again by the existing trade literature, we con-
sider generalizations of gravity models featuring: (i) multiple sectors; (ii) multiple factors;
and (iii) tradable intermediate goods. While our simple welfare formula no longer holds in
these richer environments, we demonstrate that generalized versions can easily be derived
using the same logic as in Sections 3 and 4. For all extensions, formal proofs can be found
in the Appendix.
5.1 Other gravity models
Throughout this subsection, we assume that all assumptions introduced in Section 2 hold
and that we have monopolistic competition as in Section 4. Compared to Section 4, however,
we relax some of our assumptions to allow for restricted entry, endogenous marketing costs,
and multi-product ￿rms.
Restricted entry. We start by considering the case in which entry is restricted, as in Chaney
(2008). Instead of assuming that the total measure of entrants in country j is endogenously
determined by a free entry condition, Equation (17), we assume that Mj is exogenously given.
In this situation, the exact same logic as in Section 4 implies b Pj = ￿ b ￿jj
.
". Thus the only
reason why our welfare formula may no longer hold is because changes in trade costs may
now a⁄ect aggregate pro￿ts, and in turn, total income in country j. Under a CES import
demand system, however, this e⁄ect is necessarily absent: aggregate pro￿ts are independent
of the value of trade costs. As a result, our welfare formula must remain unchanged.
Endogenous marketing costs. We now turn to the case in which marketing costs are
endogenous, as in Arkolakis (2008) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008). In order to
reach consumers with probability x in country j, a ￿rm from country i must now pay a ￿xed
cost equal to
fij (x) = fij ￿
"





The model considered in Section 4 corresponds to the particular case in which ￿ = 0. In this
situation, the marginal cost of reaching an additional consumer is constant and ￿rms ￿nd it
optimal to reach every potential consumer or none at all.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 22
Although the introduction of endogenous marketing costs is important to explain varia-
tions in the distribution of ￿rm size, it is easy to show that it has no e⁄ect on our welfare
formula. The introduction of a new margin, the share x of consumer that a ￿rm wants to
reach, again a⁄ects the structural interpretation of the trade elasticity, but nothing else.
The share of domestic expenditure and the trade elasticity remain su¢ cient statistics for the
computation of the gains form trade.
Multi-product ￿rms. In Section 4, all ￿rms can only produce one good. In the spirit of
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2009) and Arkolakis and Muendler (2007) we assume here
that each ￿rm can produce up to N goods, which we will refer to as products. Since the is a
continuum of ￿rms and a discrete number of products per ￿rm, there are no cannibalization
e⁄ects: sales of one product do not a⁄ect the sales of other products sold by the same ￿rm.
We allow productivity levels to be correlated across di⁄erent products within the same ￿rm,
and assume that ￿rms incur in the same marketing costs for each product.
The introduction of multi-product ￿rms has the same type of implications as the intro-
duction of endogenous marketing costs. It matters crucially for micro-level phenomena, such
as the impact of trade liberalization on ￿rm-level productivity, but it has no e⁄ect on the
magnitude of the gains from trade. As far as our welfare formula is concerned, the only
thing that multi-product ￿rms change is the structural interpretation of the trade elasticity,
which now includes adjustments in the number of products within each ￿rm.23
5.2 Generalized gravity models
This ￿nal subsection relaxes some of the assumptions of gravity models introduced in Sec-
tion 2. We start by introducing multiple sectors and factors and conclude with tradable
intermediate goods.
Multiple sectors. Suppose that goods ! 2 ￿ are separated into s = 1;:::;S groups of
goods, ￿s, which we refer to as sectors. Consumers in country i have preferences represented








where 0 ￿ ￿s
i ￿ 1 is the constant share of income on goods from sector s in country i; and
23This basic point would remain true if we did not have a CES import demand system. In that case, we
would need to estimate more elasticities, i.e., the entire matrix "j. But conditional on upper-level elasticities,









is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of goods in sector s with ￿s > 1
the elasticity of substitution between these goods. Compared to Section 2, the key di⁄erence
is that CES and gravity now refer to properties of the import demand system at the sector


















i0j = 0 otherwise.
Similarly, gravity now implies that bilateral imports can be decomposed into
lnX
s
ij (￿;E) = A
s
i (￿;E) + B
s







ij the iceberg trade cost between i and j in sector s, as in Costinot and Komunjer
(2007). All other properties of gravity models are unchanged.
Our results in the multi-sector case can be summarized as follows. Under perfect com-









￿ 1, where ￿
s
jj represents the
share of expenditure in sector s that goes to domestic goods in the initial equilibrium. This
formula is similar to the one derived by Donaldson (2008) using a multi-sector extension of
Eaton and Kortum (2002). For S = 1, this formula reduces to the one derived in Section 3.
For S > 1, however, we see that more aggregate statistics are necessary to estimate the gains
from trade: elasticities and shares of expenditure at the sector level, but also data on the
share of expenditure across sectors. This should not be too surprising: the less symmetry
we assume across goods, the more information we need to estimate the gains from trade.

















j is the share of employment in sector s in the initial
equilibrium. Compared to the one-sector case, we see that the mapping between data and
welfare is no longer the same under perfect and monopolistic competition. The reason is
simple. The equivalence between these two market structures in Sectors 3 and 4 relied on
the fact that there was no change in entry. In the multi-sector case, however, changes in
employment across sectors lead to changes in entry, which must be re￿ ected in the computa-
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formula.24
Although the equivalence between gravity models is admittedly weaker in the multi-
sector case, it is worth emphasizing that the core insights of Propositions 2 and 4 still hold.
In line with Section 3￿ s results, multi-sector extensions of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Anderson (1979) must therefore have the same welfare implications. The same is true about
multi-sector extensions of Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003), in line with Section 4￿ s results.
Conditional on a given market structure, either perfect or monopolistic competition, there
still exists aggregate su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis.
Multiple factors. Although the gravity models presented in Section 2 only feature one
factor of production, labor, it is trivial to extend our results to situations in which there are
f = 1;:::;F factors, but all goods ! 2 ￿ use these factors in the same proportions. In this
situation, all our results go through with a ￿composite input￿playing the same role as labor
in Sections 3 and 4. The situation in which goods may vary in factor intensity is, of course,
more complex.
One way to introduce di⁄erences in factor intensity is to assume that: (i) there are mul-
tiple sectors, as in the previous extension; (ii) all goods from the same sector have the same
factor intensity; but (iii) factor intensity di⁄ers across sectors; see e.g. Bernard, Redding
and Schott (2007) and Chor (2009). In the Appendix, we analyze the case where there are
two factors of production, capital and labor, and production functions are Cobb-Douglas










￿ 1, where ￿j only depends on variables that can be evaluated in the
initial equilibrium: shares of employment, ￿
s
j, shares of expenditures, ￿s
j, labor intensity, ￿s
j,
and the share of labor in country j￿s total income, ￿j. The correction term, ￿j, simply
captures the fact that moving to autarky in a multi-factor world also has implications for
relative factor demand, and therefore, relative factor prices.
Under monopolistic competition, a similar logic leads to a similar estimator. Formally,









￿ 1, where the




j, and ￿j. Like in the multi-sector-one-
factor case, the di⁄erence between perfect and monopolistic competition derives from the
fact that changes in employment across sectors lead to changes in entry under monopolistic
24In a related paper, Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford (2009) have developed variations of the Anderson
(1979) and Melitz (2003) models with a non-tradeable sector to illustrate the same idea: if changes in trade
costs lead to changes in entry, then models with perfect and monopolistic competition no longer have the
same welfare implications.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 25
competition, which has implications for the magnitude of the gains from trade.
To summarize, if labor is not the only factor of production, then one need more ￿local￿
data, ￿s
j and ￿j, in order to compute the magnitude of the gains from trade. But as in
the previous extension, the core insights of Propositions 2 and 4 survive. We still have
the equivalence between multi-factor extensions of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson
(1979), as in Section 3, and the equivalence between multi-factor extensions of Krugman
(1980) and Melitz (2003), as in Section 4.
Tradable intermediate goods. In Section 2, all goods were ￿nal goods. We now inves-
tigate how our welfare formula would generalize to environments in which goods ! 2 ￿ are
intermediate goods which can either be used to produce a unique non-tradeable ￿nal good
or other intermediate goods, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), Alvarez and Lucas (2007),
Atkeson and Burstein (2009), and Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). Formally, we assume
that after ￿xed costs have been paid (if any), the unit cost of production of good ! in country









where 1 ￿ ￿i represents the share of other intermediate goods in the production of good !.
Similarly, we assume that ￿xed costs under monopolistic competition are such that ￿rms




i fe in order to produce in
country i, where 1 ￿ ￿i represents the share of intermediate goods in entry costs; and (ii) a




i fij, in order to sell their varieties to country j. The
models considered in Sections 3 and 4 correspond to the special case with ￿i = ￿i = 1.
Under perfect competition, the introduction of intermediate goods ampli￿es the gains
from trade as follows. Conditional on the observed values of the share of expenditure and
the trade elasticity, the estimator of the gains from trade becomes (￿jj)
1=(￿j") ￿ 1. This
expression is similar to the one derived in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas
(2007). Jones (2009) convincingly argues that ￿j is on average equal to 1=2, hence a country
like Belgium with ￿BEL = 0:73 experiences gains from trade (using " = ￿5) of 13% rather
than 6%. Intuitively, a given decrease in ￿jj is now associated with bigger welfare gains
in country j since it also captures the lower costs of intermediate goods. The larger the
share ￿j of intermediate goods in the production of other intermediate goods, the larger the
ampli￿cation e⁄ect caused by this input-output loop.
Under monopolistic competition, we can use the same logic to show that the estimator
of the gains from trade is (￿jj)
1
￿j"+1￿￿j ￿ 1. For ￿j = 1, our welfare formula is therefore theNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 26
same under both monopolistic and perfect competition. By contrast, for ￿j 6= 1, we see that
conditional on trade data, ￿jj and ", the gains from trade predicted by models with monop-
olistic competition are larger, re￿ ecting the increase in the number of entrants associated
with the decrease in country j￿ s consumer price index. If we assume that intermediate goods
are just as important in entry costs as in marketing and production costs (i.e., ￿j = ￿j),
then we can use our modi￿ed formula to compute Belgium￿ s gains from trade. Using again
" = ￿5 and ￿j = 1=2, these gains would now be 17% rather than 13%. Of course, if ￿j > ￿j
then trade leads to a lower expansion of entry and lower gains from trade (relative to the
case with ￿j = ￿j).
The broad implications of this last extension are very similar to those we reached in the
two previous ones: unless the introduction of intermediate goods does not lead to changes
in the number of entrants, which is the case for ￿j = 1, the welfare implications of models
with perfect and monopolistic competition are no longer the same. Nevertheless, within both
classes of model, there still exist aggregate su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis.
Although this section was not meant as an exhaustive analysis of all possible variations,
combinations, and generalizations of gravity models, we wish to conclude by pointing out one
class of extensions which we view as particularly important for future research. Throughout
this section, we have relaxed various supply-side assumptions, but we have maintained the
assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences under monopolistic competition. Allowing for quasi-
linear or translog preferences as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Feenstra and Weinstein
(2009) would introduce variations in mark-ups, and hence, a new source of gains from trade.
While the introduction of these pro-competitive e⁄ects would clearly a⁄ect the composition
of the gains from trade, we strongly conjecture that the two su¢ cient statistics identi￿ed
in our paper, ￿ and ", would still play a crucial role in determining their total size, albeit
perhaps in a di⁄erent way.25
6 Concluding Remarks
Micro-level data have had a profound in￿ uence on research in international trade over the
last ten years. In many regards, this research agenda has been very successful. New stylized
facts have been uncovered and new trade models have been developed to explain these facts.
In this paper we have investigated to which extent answers to new micro-level questions have
25In Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), for instance, it is easy to check that although mark-ups
vary at the ￿rm-level, our simple welfare formula remains unchanged.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 27
a⁄ected answers to an old and central question in the ￿eld: How large are the gains from
trade? A crude summary of our results is: ￿So far, not much.￿
The ￿rst message of our paper is therefore a cautionary one. Although it may be tempting
to think that new and richer trade models necessarily entail larger gains from trade, our
analysis demonstrates that this is not the case. Within the class of trade models considered
in this paper, the number of sources of gains from trade varies, but conditional on observed
trade data, the total size of the gains from trade does not.
The second message of our paper is a positive one. The ￿ ip side of our strong equivalence
results is that within a particular but important class of trade models, there exist two
su¢ cient statistics for welfare analysis: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods; and
(ii) a gravity-based estimate of the trade elasticity. Hence only a very limited amount of
macro data may be necessary to make robust counterfactual predictions, whatever the micro
level details of a particular trade model may be.
This last observation, however, leaves us with a puzzle. If many of our theoretical models
predict the same gains from trade, how can these gains be so much smaller than the reduced-
form estimates uncovered by empirical researchers? For instance, Feyrer (2009) concludes
that an increase in trade volumes of 10% implies an increase in real income of 5%. While
this elasticity lies below the previous estimates of Frankel and Romer (1999), it is an order
of magnitude larger than the elasticity implied by gravity models.26 How does one reconcile
theory and empirics? If micro-level adjustments are not the answer, what sources of gains
from trade can quantitatively account for the discrepancy between our models and these
reduced-form estimates? These are exciting open questions waiting to be answered.27
26To see this, consider a hypothetical country with an import penetration ratio of 20%, halfway between
the ratios of 27% and 7% for Belgium and the United States mentioned in the Introduction. A 10% increase
in trade would increase the import penetration ratio to 22%, and so, lower the share of expenditure ￿ from
80% to 78%. Under the favorable assumption that " = ￿5, Propositions 1 and 3 would only predict an
increase in real income of 0:5%. Even if we allow for the maximum ampli￿cation e⁄ects derived above with
trade in intermediate goods under monopolistic competition, the welfare gains may only increase to 1:25%,
still far from Feyrer￿ s 5%.
27One interesting possibility is that trade may facilitate other ways through which countries gain from
openness, e.g., multinational production or the di⁄usion of ideas. Ramondo and Rodr￿guez-Clare (2009)
o⁄er quantitative results consistent with that idea: in a model of trade and multinational production, they
￿nd that the gains from trade can be almost twice as large as those predicted by gravity models.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 28
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A Proofs (I): Perfect Competition
Proof of Lemma 1. In the main text, we have already established that
b Pj =
Pn
i=1 ￿ij (b wi + b ￿ij). (27)
Under perfect competition we know that bilateral imports, Xij, only depend on prices; and
by Equation (4), we know that prices only depend on wages and variable trade costs through
their product, wi￿ij. Using these two observations and the de￿nition of "ii0
j , we can express
the percentage changes in relative imports as




j (b wi0 + b ￿i0j). (28)
In the case of a CES import demand system, Equation (28) simpli￿es into
b Xij ￿ b Xjj = "(b wi0 + b ￿i0j). (29)









To conclude the proof of Lemma 1, we note that
Pn
i=1 ￿ij = 1 implies
Pn
i=1 ￿ijb ￿ij = 0.
Combining this observation with Equation (30), we get Equation (9). QED.





Let ￿jj and ￿
0
jj denotes the share of expenditure on domestic goods in the trade equilibria
associated with ￿ and ￿ 0, respectively. Similarly, let Pj and P 0
j denote the consumer price
in country j in the two equilibria. Since " is constant across all trade equilibria, we can
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. Thus, Equation (32) implies








Since " is a consistent estimator of ", by assumption, and Wj is a continuous function of ", by






is a consistent estimator of Wj. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2. By assumption, we know that for any i 6= j, lim￿ij!+1 (wi￿ij) =
+1. Thus, we must have ￿
0
jj = 1 at ￿ = +1. Proposition 2 directly follows from this
observation, Proposition 1, and the de￿nition of W j ￿ ￿(Wj)￿=+1. QED.
Counterfactual Changes in Trade Costs. In footnote 16, we have argued that condi-
tional on trade data, X and ", the predicted changes in welfare associated with any coun-
terfactual changes in trade costs are the same in Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum
(2002). We now demonstrate this result formally. By Equation (12), we know that the share











Now consider a change in trade costs from ￿ to ￿ 0. The share of expenditure on goods from
































i0=1 ￿i0j (e wi0e ￿i0j)
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i0=1 ￿i0j (e wi0e ￿i0j)
" e wj￿ijwjLj




￿ij (e wie ￿ij)
"
PI
i0=1 ￿i0j (e wi0e ￿i0j)
" ￿ e wjYj (39)
Since Yj ￿
Pn
i0=1 Xi0j and ￿ij ￿ Xij/Yj, Equation 39 implies that conditional on trade data,
X, and the trade elasticity, ", the proportional changes in wages predicted by Anderson
(1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) are the same. By Equation 38, this further implies
that the proportional changes in shares of expenditures predicted by the two models are
the same as well. By Proposition 1, we know that the changes in welfare associated with a
change in trade costs from ￿ to ￿ 0 are given by





Since e ￿jj is the same in Anderson (1979) and Eaton and Kortum (2002), Wj is the same
as well. Our claim directly follows from this observation and the fact that " is a consistent
estimator of " in both models. QED.
B Proofs (II): Monopolistic Competition
Proof of Lemma 2. In order to establish Equation (21), we proceed in 6 steps. For
expositional purposes, we again suppress the arguments (￿;E) ￿ (￿;w1;:::;wn;M1;:::;Mn),
but it should be clear that, like in the main text, all endogenous variables, Pj, z￿
ij, and Xij
are functions of (￿;w1;:::;wn;M1;:::;Mn).





￿ ￿ 1 + ￿ij
￿
(b wi + b ￿ij)
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￿ij b wi ￿
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By di⁄erentiating Equation (16) and using the fact that wj = 1, we know that
c z￿





b wi ￿ b Pj. (42)
Combining Equations (41) and (42), we obtain Equation (40).
Step 2: Percentage changes in the cut-o⁄ productivity levels are given by
c z￿










(b wi0 + b ￿i0j)
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i0j










1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿j
#
.
Equation (43) derives from Equations (40) and (42).
Step 3: For any i = 1;:::;n, j = 1;:::;n, we must have ￿ij = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ".
Using Equations (1), (13), (15), (16), and the fact that wj = 1, we can express bilateral

















b Xij = (1 ￿ ￿)(b wi + b ￿ij) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) b Pj + c Mi ￿ ￿ijc z￿
ij. (44)
Similarly, we have
b Xjj = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) b Pj + c Mj ￿ ￿jjc z￿
jj. (45)
Combining Equations (44) and (45), we obtain
b Xij ￿ b Xjj = (1 ￿ ￿)(b wi + b ￿ij) + c Mi ￿ c Mj ￿ ￿ijc z￿
ij + ￿jjc z￿
jj,New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 36
which can be rearranged as














































By de￿nition, we know that "ii0
j =
@ ln(Xij=Xjj)

























































In a CES import demand system, we know that "ii0
j = " if i0 = i and "ii0
j = 0 otherwise.
Combining this observation with Equation (47), we get ￿ij = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ " for all i,j.
Step 4: Percentage changes in relative imports are given by
b Xij ￿ b Xjj = "
￿
b ￿ij + b wi +
￿





+ c Mi ￿ c Mj. (48)
Equation (48) derives from Equations (43) and (46) and the fact that ￿ij = 1￿￿ ￿" for all
i,j.
Step 5: Percentage changes in the consumer price index satisfy
b Pj = ￿
b ￿jj ￿ c Mj
"
. (49)
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Using the same logic as in Lemma 1, we then obtain Equation (49).
Step 6: There are no changes in the measure of entrants, c Mj = 0.
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ji = 0, (50)

































￿￿1gj (z)dz = Lj.









ji = 0. (52)
Using the fact that ￿ij = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ", Equations (50) and (52) imply
c Mj = 0.
Combining the previous expression with Equation (49), we get Equation (21). QED.New Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 38
C Proofs (III): Other Gravity Models
Restricted Entry. In the main text, we have argued that in a model with restricted entry,
the gains from trade can still be consistently estimated by (￿jj)
1/"￿1. We now demonstrate
this result formally. Since the equilibrium conditions (13)-(16) still hold under restricted
entry, we can follow the exact same steps as in Lemma 2 to show that b Pj = ￿
￿
b ￿jj ￿ c Mj
￿.
".
Since c Mj = 0 by assumption, we obtain
b Pj = ￿ b ￿jj
.
", (53)
as stated in the main text. Let us now show that b Yj = 0. Under restricted entry, the trade
balance condition, Equation (18), becomes
Yj = wjLj + ￿j,
where ￿j are aggregate pro￿ts in country j. Di⁄erentiating the previous expression and
using the fact that b wj = 0, we obtain
b Yj = ￿jb ￿j, (54)
where ￿j = ￿j/Yj is the share of aggregate pro￿ts in country j￿ s total income. Using
Equation (14), we can express aggregate pro￿ts as



























where ￿ji is given by Equation (51). Similarly, we can express total income in country j as
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Using the fact that " < 0, we obtain
Pn
i=1 ￿jib z￿
ji = 0 and in turn
b Yj = 0. (57)
Starting from Equations (53) and (57), we can use the same arguments as in Propositions
3 and 4 to conclude that our estimator of the gains from trade is still given by (￿jj)
1=" ￿ 1.
QED.
Endogenous marketing costs. In the main text, we have argued that in a model with
endogenous marketing costs, the gains from trade can still be consistently estimated by
(￿jj)
1/" ￿ 1. To see this, note that the pro￿t-maximization program of a ￿rm with produc-
tivity z is now given by
















where the optimal pricing rule is as in (13). The ￿rst-order condition of that program
associated with x implies







, for all z ￿ z
￿
ij,
where xij (z) represents the fraction of consumers from country j reached by a ￿rm from
country i with productivity z; and the productivity cut-o⁄z￿
ij is still given by Equation (22).
Since the price of a given good is in￿nite for a consumer who is not reached by a ￿rm, theNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 40





















1￿￿ ￿ gi (z)dz .










































Starting from Equation (58), we can then follow the exact same steps as in Lemma 2,
Propositions 3 and 4. The only di⁄erence is that e ￿ij now plays the role of ￿ij. QED.
Multi-product ￿rms. In the main text, we have argued that in a model with multi-product
￿rms, the gains from trade can still be consistently estimated by (￿jj)
1/"￿1. Before showing
this formally, let us introduce the following notation. We denote by zk the productivity of
a ￿rm in producing its k-th product for k = 1;:::;K. Without loss of generality, we order
products for each ￿rm such that z1 ￿ ::: ￿ zK and denote by gi (z1;:::;zK) the density
function from which productivity levels are randomly drawn across ￿rms. With a slight
abuse of notation we denote by gi (z1) the marginal density of the highest productivity
level, and similarly, we denote by gi (zkjzk￿1;:::;z1) the associated conditional densities for
k = 2;:::;K.
Using the above notation, we can now express the consumer price index of a representative
















1￿￿ ￿ gi (z1)dz1,
where the productivity cut-o⁄z￿
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K ￿ gi (zKjzK￿1;:::;z1)dzK .
















































where e e ￿ij is now given by
























where S2 refers to the derivative of S with respect to its second argument. Starting from
Equation (58), we can then follow the exact same steps as in Lemma 2, Propositions 3 and
4. The only di⁄erence is that e e ￿ij plays the role of ￿ij. QED.
D Proofs (IV): Generalized Gravity Models
Multiple sectors. In the main text, we have argued that in the multi-sector case, the gains
























￿ 1, under monopolistic competition. We now demonstrate these
two results formally.










ij + b wi
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ij is the share of expenditure on goods from country i in country j and sector s.
Combining Equations (61) and (60) and simplifying yields












Integrating the previous expression as in the proof of Proposition 1 and using the de￿nition
of Wj, we get













Our estimator for the gains from trade under perfect competition derives from Equation (62)
and the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Now consider the case of monopolistic competition. Using the same arguments as in
Lemma 2, it is easy to show that














j in the number of entrants in country j and sector s. In order to compute the
changes in the number of entrants, we can adopt the same strategy as in Step 6 of the proof

























j (z)dz = f
s
e,
where the s-superscripts re￿ ect that all variables, parameters and functions may now vary






ji = 0, (64)
with ￿
s
ji the share of total revenues in country j and sector s associated with sales in countryNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 43






















j is the endogenous amount of labor in sector s in country j. Di⁄erentiating the
previous expression and using Equation (64), we obtain c Ms
j = b Ls
j. Together with Equation
(63), this implies












Like in the case of perfect competition, we can then integrate the previous expression and
use the de￿nition of Wj to get















Our estimator for the gains from trade under monopolistic competition derives from Equation
(65) and the fact that with Cobb-Douglas preferences, the share of employment in sector s
under autarky must be equal to the share of expenditure ￿s
j. QED.
Multiple factors. As mentioned in the main text, we now generalize our multi-sector
extension by assuming that there are two factors of production, capital and labor. We
assume that production functions are Cobb-Douglas in all sectors. Formally, the variable














where wi and ri are the price of labor and capital in country i, respectively; and ￿s
i is the
labor intensity in sector s and country i. In the case of monopolistic competition, we further
assume that labor intensity, ￿s









Consider ￿rst the case of perfect competition. Using the same logic as in the previousNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 44






















































Let us now compute b rj. First, note that because of Cobb-Douglas production functions, in


















j are the amounts of labor and capital, respectively, in sector s in country








































































































































With multiple factors of production, trade balance implies
Yj = wjLj + rjKj.















are the share of labor in
country j￿ s income in the initial and counterfactual equilibrium, respectively. Using Equa-





















































￿0 = 1. Thus Equation (67) and the
previous expression imply


















































This completes our proof under perfect competition.
Now consider the case of monopolistic competition. In this situation, we assume that
factor intensity is the same for ￿xed and variable costs in all sectors. The same argument as
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Let us now compute c Ms






ji = 0, (70)
with ￿
s
ji the share of total revenues in country j and sector s associated with sales in country



























j are the endogenous amounts of labor and capital, respectively, used in


























Di⁄erentiating the previous expression and using Equation (70), we obtain
c M
s
j = b L
s
j ￿ b c
s



















where the second equality follows from the same logic as under perfect competition. Com-


































The rest of the proof is similar to what we did under perfect competition. After some simple
algebra, we obtain







































































This completes the second part of our proof in the multi-factor case. QED.
Tradable intermediate goods. Consider ￿rst the case of perfect competition. We assume
that intermediate goods are aggregated into a non-tradable good that can be either consumed
or combined with labor to produce a ￿composite input￿that will be used, in turn, in the
production of intermediate goods. Formally, if we denote by Ki the quantity of the non-
tradable aggregate good allocated to the production of the composite input in country i,






i . Since the price of
the non-tradable good is equal to the consumer price index in country i, the unit cost of Qi




i , justifying Equation (26) in the main text.
Under these assumptions, the equilibrium conditions remain given by Equations (4)-(6),
but with cj and Qj substituting for wj and Lj. Using the composite input in country j
as our numeraire, cj = 1, we can therefore follow the same logic as in Lemma 1 to show
that changes in the consumer price index satisfy b Pj = ￿b ￿jj=". Since wj is no longer our
numeraire, we however need to take changes in into account in our welfare computations.








, where wj and w0
j are the wages in the initial and
the new equilibrium, respectively. This implies
\ 1 ￿ Wj = b Pj ￿ b wj = ￿b ￿jj="￿j, (72)
where the second equality comes from the fact that
￿j b wj + (1 ￿ ￿j)b Pj = 0, (73)
by our choice of numeraire. Starting from Equation (72), we can then use the same arguments
as in Propositions 1 and 2 to conclude that our estimator of the gains from trade is now
given by (￿jj)
1=(￿j") ￿ 1.
Consider now the case of monopolistic competition. We maintain the assumption that
labor and the aggregate non-tradable good are used to produce a common input with unitNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 48




i . Compared to the case of perfect competition, we assume that this
common input is used both for the production of intermediate goods and the payment of
￿xed marketing costs, now equal to cifij. In addition, we assume that labor and the non-
tradable aggregate good can be combined for the payment of ￿xed entry costs. In order to






Under these assumptions, Equations (13)-(16) and (18) still hold in equilibrium, but with
cj and Qj substituting for wj and Lj. Given that cjQj = wjLj + PjKj, then we now have
Yj = wjLj + PjKj: (74)



















gj (z)dz = c
e
j. (75)
Using Equations (13)-(16) and the same logic as in Lemma 2￿ Steps 1 through 5￿ it easy
to show that changes in the consumer price index still satisfy
b Pj = ￿
￿
b ￿jj ￿ c Mj
￿
=". (76)
We now build on Equation (75) and the logic of Step 6 in Lemma 2 to show that c Mj =
￿(
1￿￿j




j the amount of labor
and the composite good used for production and marketing costs; and similarly, we denote
by LE
j and KE
j the amounts of labor and the composite input used for entry. Our formal
argument proceeds in three steps.
Step 1: Percentage changes in the number of entrants satisfy






Given our Cobb-Douglas aggregator, we know that
Mjfe = ￿
￿￿j
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Di⁄erentiating Equations (78) and (79), we obtain after rearrangements
c Mj = b L
E
j + (1 ￿ ￿j)
￿
b wj ￿ b Pj
￿
Combining the previous expression with Equation (73), which still holds by our choice of
numeraire, we obtain Equation (77).
Step 2: Percentage changes in the amount of the composite good satisfy


































By de￿nition, we also know that Kj = K
Q
j + KE
j and Lj = L
Q
j + LE
j . Using Equations (79)

































b wj ￿ b Pj
￿
. (82)
Equation (80) directly derives from Equations (73) and (82).
Step 3: The amount of labor used for entry does not vary with trade costs: b LE
j = 0.




















where ￿ji the share of total revenues in country j associated with sales in country i. EquationsNew Trade Models, Same Old Gains? 50













￿￿1gj (z)dz = wjLj + PjKj.
Di⁄erentiating the previous expression and combining it with Equation (83), we obtain
c Mj +
￿
















= (1 ￿ ￿j) b wj + ￿j
￿
b Pj + b Kj
￿
,
where ￿j ￿ PjKj/(wjLj + PjKj). Combining the previous expression with Equations (73),




































































ji z￿￿1gj (z)dz + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
R +1
z￿



















































= 0 for all z￿
ji. Combining this
observation with Equation (85), we obtain b LE
j = 0.
To conclude, note that Steps 1 and 3 imply c Mj = ￿(
1￿￿j
￿j )b Pj. Together with Equation
(76), this implies b Pj = ￿￿jb ￿jj=
￿
￿j" + 1 ￿ ￿j
￿
. Using Equation (73) and the fact that
\ 1 ￿ Wj = b Pj ￿ b wj, we obtain \ 1 ￿ Wj = ￿b ￿jj=
￿
￿j" + 1 ￿ ￿j
￿
. The rest of the proof is the
same as under perfect competition. QED.